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I 
"The settlers; tmm is e stron;ly-huilt tm-111, all made of 
stone and steel. It is 2 bripJ:tly--li t tm-m; the streetc are covered 
with asphalt, and the ;:,arbage-cans ::n-.•,-d.low all the leavir.o;s, unseen, 
unknown and :,ardly thought .?,bout. The settler's feet are never visible, 
except perhaps in th~ sen: but there you 1 re never close enou~h to see 
them. llis feet are protectec~. by stronr, sl.oes c1J.tl1ou~li tl1e streets of 
his town arc clean tmd even, \•Jith no holes or stones, The settler's 
town is a well-fed town, an easy-,4oin3 toww, its belly :Ls ah-1eys full 
of good things. The settler's town is a town of ~ihite -people, of 
foreigners. 
The town belon['.ing to the colonized people, or nt least the 
native town, t:1e i-:egro villar;e, the medina, tl1e reservation, is 2 
place of ill fane people<' by men cf evil repute. 'i'i:ey are born there, 
it matters little i,1here or ::ow; th.~y die tl1ere, it mDtte:cs not \.rhere 
nor how. It is a vorld 1-1it::out spaciousness: rien Jive there on ton of 
each otl,er, anc.; their huts 2.re built one or:. tor cf t:1e other. The native 
tm-m is a hunrry town, starved of J.;re:>.(1, of r-1eat, of shoer,, c,f coal, of 
light. The native tmm is n crouchinr, vj_L.ar;c, ,:1 trn-,,, on itE knees, .:-, 
"'tm-m wallouinr. in the :••ire. It is town of: ni,:,:sers anc' ,'irt:.r ar2.bc.. 
The town that tile native turns on the settler';: tmm L:; 2 look of lust, 
a look of envy ... '' (1;:--.non) 
The year 2000 is only JJ yea!"B ;:,u;·v. 'l;_,'.'lt ire tlte ye_::,r 0 .-e 1-•one to retire, 
and it can serve ac 2 useful horizon fc,,· vieuin~. t'.:e teri-i[,J.c- ,..,rol·lems of the 
underdeveloped world and the pos::di· lr:: rc]_e for Cc.,i1ad2. 
The prospects for the world in our time -'..1.re not <;ood. It is in the context 
of a bleak picture that C:.madiar..s :"mst choose anc.; set. It is likely that at the 
outset of the 21st century the number of people livinp; in povertv uill be as much 
as double the current nur,_1ber. He have fe\; illusions about dwt Canada ,;,.rill be 
willing to do. He suggest policies that are possible even if not probable. Even 
a small power, if it understands the situation, can do something to help, and in 
some cases, this can even be done with little cost and great benefit to itself. 
There is a conflict of interest between the first n.nd third ~•mrld. Canada 
has a choice between being a middle nower in the first uorld or makin?- a heroic 
effort to transcend this c..onflict. It can do this by providing wider 
options for underdeveloped countries. Ca1tDclc1. c:.mnot by itself solve the problems 
of the undenleveloped Hor}d, but it car, contribute to ar, cr-vironFJ.ent in whj_ch 
the underdeveloped cot:-1:tr.i.es hav:~ 2 chance to r,elp tLemselves. 
The underdevelope<l cour;tries Jo not have mucl1 scope for indepennent ,1ction. 
Their resources are too limited. Still, they clc, not do ns •.,ell 2-s they r1ight. 
They inherit from thei.r past, and from their coloniaJ experience, institutions 
unsuited to their present ,problems. 
In Canadn, it is will rather than ability which is lacking. Fe are on the 
threshold of a neF era where our own basic problems of food, clothing and shelter 
car: be solved, by old standards, at least. The material base provj_des the oppor­
tunity for new initiatives. There is the nossibility for exI)eriment. 
Surprisingly, there is :J. neu significance in small un:i_ts. It is, for example, 
at the level of the citv that HG now face the itl'port2nt auestions of hoH we live, 
walk, eat, work, learn, sleep and pray. And recent Canadian experience shows that 
the most vigorous quest for,, life style occurs at the provincial, not the national 
level. 
At the international level, indepe:1dence for Canada is only meaningful in 
relation to the great issues the world noH faces. For our lifetime the problems 
of the underdeveloped countries will intensify, cmd though we try to ignore them, 
we can do so only by sacrificing part of ourselves. "There are no innocents and 




The i'acts about vorld :9overty ::ire \7ell lmoun . 1 They are publicized o.nd 
re,Jeated from the most respectable sources--but like the death statistics of 
c;reat disasters~ they are beyond comprehension. Nevertheless, it is worth rc­
peatinc; thei:1~ beco.use the~, o.re to be Hith us for the foreseeo.ble future) perhaps 
l7ith increasinG horrQj_". 
Such a recito.tion of the crude facts must include the information that: 
1. 1~t cErrent c_;rowtll ro.tes, the c;o.p betHeen the poor and the 1·1eo.lthy 
nations incTeases steG.C'.ily; in the rich countries rapid anc~ steady tech­
noloe;ical chanc:;e )l'ovidcs the :·.1.:::.in iii1petus for c;routh while the underdeveloped 
countries ho.ve the ;:::reo.test di:Cf'iclllt~, in ,::j)sorbinc; the teclL.1olo0y that 
already exists, "In ·L10 rich couLtries avernc12 incoi:1e per heG.d is c;oinc; up 
· about &,50 a year, in tlle poor cotmtries by 2.bou.t ~;2. 50 a. yea:r· and in the very 
112poor countries by o.bout $1. 50 )Cl' year. The cap for the. p·oor between what 
they de nnJ the potcnti::il provicicd by ,-:iollcru technology. g,.rows each year. 
2. llithin the poor "\·Iorld, the ri1ore prosperous nuclei are not c.;rm·1inc; fast 
enouc;h to lower the o.bsolute nwnber living in rural poverty. GrouinG pools 
of unern.ployi.:1ent are the result. 
3. Population c;rm-1th has become such tho.t it is becoming r.1ore difficult 
to meet even rniniw.al requirements of bare e;dstence. 
4. Even if grm1th ro.tes of 6 per cent rier a1mw,1 uere o.chieved--Hell in 
excess of past o.vero.c;e perforraance and even Greater than the objectives 
of the U.N. develo1,;:ient deco.cle--by the end of this century the i,er capita 
income of the poor countries 1.10uld still be dism:::..lly 1011--perhaps only 
$100 per capik: in India o.nd in some 1\frican countries, for e:;:maple. 
Econori1ics is ac;o.in the cLismal science. 
" 
III 
Typically these facts are introduced ets a ~)relucle to charito.ble in::;tincts; 
,-re parade the poor and pass the plate. That little comes of this is perhaps to 
be expected. On the douestic scene very fe1·1 of our deep-seated social 01· economic 
problcr.is ho.ve been solved by an appeal to predominantly charitable instincts. The 
auounts generate( arc inevitably s111all and their allocation is r:iore closely 
to.ilored to the tastes of the donor than the needs of the reci~,ient. 
3 
onIn the developr,lent of the first world, primary reliance has been 1)10.ced 
the private initiative of businessL1cn to mobilize resources for capital :::~orriiation 
and technologica.l cho.nc;e. T:1e :;overnrn.ent ho.s acted to helJ business o.ncl to alile-
serious cislocations resultinc; from industrialization:liorate soT!le of the uore 
but by and lar::;e has not :9layed an initfo.ting role e;~cept for overhead capital. 
There is little reason to exiJect the government to do abroad 1·1hnt it C:oes not J.o 
at home. It is more in line with our history that governments lool~ at theil· aid 
programs as handmaidens to the 1,rivate business ::;ector (their mm or those abroad) 
rather than as the rnain vehicle of gr01.·1th. Even if the govern.L1ent 11ishec1 to do 
otheruise it has little scope beco.use it is not government but our 2c,rivate corpora­
tions tho.t possess the capital, teclmoloe;y and ente1·prise that are so bo.c.1ly 
needed abroad. If such institutions·co.n be little influenced even at home; it 
is hardl;r surprisinc; that they cannot be 1:iobilized for :public purposes abroad. 
The total volw:ie of i.-rorld aid, o.fter o. period of rapid gr01·1th. lms sto.Gnated 
4 Since some of 1·1hat '\'Te call aid is not an outriGht Gift butin recent years, 
merely a lone; ter~il loan at interest rates which are lm·; only in coLY.[)a1~ison uith 
recent market ra.tes; the net free forei0n exchange rnac1e a.vo.ilable to countries 
on public account is declinine::;;, the f'lo1·1 of interest costs and debt repayment out 
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of the unC.e:cdevelo::;,e( countric:c'. offsets a s·L,bstantio.l proportion of the c;ross 
aid. ,\ nwi1ber of devclopin:.:; count:ties llo.ve therefore found theuselves in severe 
balance of pn:r,,1ents c.~ifficult::.es_ to 1-rhich hco.vy fixed oblic;ations to r:;ervice 
overseas holclin2;s of rmblic debt hnve ;;1ade :1 siGnificant cont1·ibution. 
5 
account flmrs: the reverse flO"",! of earningsEven more serious are privo.te 
and of carital transfe1· h:1ve uore than outweie:;hec.1 neu forei~n invest,,ent. The 
foreicn investr.ient 11l1icl1 does occu:;: is concentro.tec."i. in industries s2.tis:i:'yinc; 
the needs of the develcpe:l ,·:orld) such 0.2. tlle pctrclew-.1 ir,dustr~,, rather than 
being directed tmmrcls eD[}~nc.~erin0 encloc;enous cro,!th processes -:,iti:ili -:~he Lmder-
loo.us. BusinessLlel1 ~,ishin:;:; to s-~J_l to tl:te Lmdenkvclo1_;2C:, ,rc,rld receive [~Teat 
the projects ·.,hicb 1;0ulll be rejecte6. i:1 "che cc,1.te:~t o:::' 0.:1 c.icl proc;r;:i_;-_i;;1e. The 
harrassec.1 bureancro.cies of underdevelo11ed countries accept this /or,.! oi' help. 
some-Thie short-teri:J. cornrn.erciaJ. crec.ti t on h:::i.rd ·c.er;.1s creo.tes fi;:ed obli::;ations, 
times of alarminc; proportion. Overseo.s finance in these circumstances creates 
a resource transfer in the short-terr;1 but fairly soon the c1ebt 1J.ust be repo.yed_, 
often before the investment ~rield.s a return. The lmderdeveloped countries then 
appeal for refinancins and, throuc;h virtual internationc..l banL:i·uj.c1tcy, losemust 
control over their policies to the lendin.c; nations, typically through the uecliurn 
of international ac;encies. 
The Econor.-1ist 's repo1·t on the treo.tr:1.ent of Ghana provides o. case in point 
(AUc,USr• t (..ll; .L"9~')bo . The Economist estii!lated thc..t Ghana's public debt iTas over 
one billion c1olle.re- and over ·c;,o-thirds of this total ,ms in debt of o.vero.ce 
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;mturit~r of r~ix yeo.;_'s or ler.c. Their toncue-in-cheet descripti.on of the pre-
liuill.J.ry creclitor's ;J1eetinc oi' June, 1966, runs : 
"Gh::rna e:;~pla.ined its plic;ht to the repre sentative s 
of 13 uestern countries, the e;eneral reaction uas somewhat 
reserved. The '?wis::; s3.ic1, predictably, that debts uere debts 
and they hoped S1·1iss debts uould be paid prom:r,tly. The Ger­
man delegate brought up the question of German property con­
fiscated in Ghana durinc; the uar. The Isro.eli delecate saio. 
he hoped Israel uould be considered to qualify as one of the 
underdevelo:9ed countries entitled to uninterrupted repayment. 
The British clele::;o.te said he hoped any stretch-out of repay­
ments woul6. be a "reasonably short one". 
The ineffectiveness of aid not only derives from the inndequacy of the 
net flm:s c,nrJ. the da.ne;ers of excessive interna.tional indebtedness; but also 
results frou the chnr.J.cte:c of the aid Given. 
Politics o.nd clevelopnent are necessaril~,r interrelated. But the }?Olitical 
con'.::.ent of aid :9:ro::;rarnnes j_s urifortunate, for the distribution bf nic.~ is more 
influence<l by the stratec;ic and ideolo::_;;ico.l pre-conceptions of the i;njor donors 
than bJ any o.ssess1:1ent of the c;enuine uevelopment imJ;lications of the political 
. . G
institutions of the recipients. Since there is no underlyil1G harrnon~' of inte1·est, 
these differences arc critico.l. Only too often stratec;ic considerations are 
interpreted in a short-tern context, stres.sine; foreic;n rather than clo1:1estic 
policies of the recipients. 
This is perhaps not surprisinc;. Aid, after all; could only have reached 
the level it has if somethinc more than the charitable instincts hG.cl been aroused. 
It ,..,ould matter less if the amount involved 1-1erc very large. "Client
11 
states of the Unitecl rtates in the Far :=ast have achieved very f,:ivourable rates 
of crowth--Formosa :.:md South Kore.:i.;; i:'or example. If the i·Tealthy countries are 
,dllins to to.tea sizeable enouc;h interest in a country it may well develop 
irres:pectivc of the other circu:;1stances. 
-7·· 
Ho1,ever, no such lnr~c i'lo·,r is li::eJ.;,- unC effectiveness of the ,;1eac;re flm; 
is reduced by non-econo:,1ic choices, so1,,etirnes to the :)oint of countel"-effective-
ness b;'( bolstel"in:..:; rec;i.r.1es o.lie:1 to C:.evcJ.opne:.--1t. 
IV 
Not surprisingly; aid has not 1mrted miracles. Throuc;hout the t11ird 110rld 
political tensions and conl'licts continue ancl are; if anythinr;, ac;c:;1·0.vated by 
grm,th. 
Trae;ically, :,1m·,eve:r, the frustrations and. tensions are not finc,inc; their 
outlet in creative social transfornation, but in civil and regional strife uith 
destructive corisequences. Progrm:iues of national independence, initially focused 
ae;ainst colonial pouer s, be cos.1e b;.1nnc· s for stru.:_;gle s bctueen ::!:roups in the under­
developed 1-,orlc:.. These ter::.sions and coi:flicts are inevitable. The apyeal to 
increase aid to avoid :cevolution is botll clanc;erous, because it avoidc the reality 
of the :!_,oor world;, anc~. dishonest in that it cnnnot succeed in any such purpose, 
at the aic"i levels 1.1hich c.re envisnse(. If the prevention of revolution is seen 
as one of the pur11oses of uid) it is only too easy to tm"n to other tools uhen aid 
fails to achieve the desiTec1 counter-revolutionary purpose. 
Seen at the c1eepe st level, the c1ilei;Jmo. of aic1: both in the form of capital 
ancl technical assistance_ is that it bolsters the metropolitan influence in the 
ex-colonial uorld, uhen the most :r,rofound ;_:irobler:is in the recipient countries 
involve the need to breo.~: fror. certnin social; economic and culturo.l metropolitan 
influences, no i,iatter ho~, altnlistic tlle r:iotivo.tion of the uother country. Develop-
dent is macle .::::t houe. 
The ::mimer tho.t is so:i:eti1~1es o:f':Cercc~ ic dultilc.teralis::1--0. populc.r vie,r in 
() 
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Canada. But international ac;encies tal:e on the ideoloc;ical overtones anL'. cultural 
asswnptions of their 1:10.jor sponsors. This is certainl~r true of the ~!orlcl Banl;:, 
for example, with its Auerican-1\nclo aL1bience. Even \'Jhen international ae;encies 
develop vieus ancl interests 1-1hich are not too tied to the foreicn policy objec-
tives of a major co1.mtry, multilate:c~alisrn. is only satisfactory as an addition 
to the conotellation; rather tho.n as a consolidation ancl replacenent for other 
aiC sources. In the end) inclividual m1clerdevelo:9ed countries are better off when 
faced uith a nu.Dber of' )arties on the other side of the to.ble in international 
financial nec;otiations. 11Fhen thieves fall out; 
II 
It is ver~r i::iportcmt for poor countries to have o. ranc;e of choice, so that 
the conseq_uences of breakinc; ,·Tith one source of support is not necesso.:c~ily 
disastrous. 
Effectiveness of aid is also reduced by policies -which use aid proc;rarnmes 
as a tool of trade policy. 7 The no11 prevalent practice of tyin0 bilateral 
aid to ir:1ported goods fror.~ the donor (even the U.S. is nou forced in this direc­
tion by her chronic balance of payments problem), ,·rarps the design of plans and 
projects, reduces the real value of the aid flmr, and h2.s undesirable effects on 
the evolution of trade )at-terns by inhibitinc; trade uithin the poor Horld. 
In criticizinc; aid policy there is no intention to imply rna.licionsness 
amongst aid agencies anymore than it characterized the colonial civil service. 
' 
They are staffed by the nost hw:iane of public se1·vants. HoHever, the e;~ie;encies 
of the balance of payments crises in the United KingdoLl_ for example_ have been 
such that it is hardly surprisin0 that there should have been an atter.1::_,t to mini-
8
mize the foreic;n exchange costs of the aid proc;rar;u;ie. Foreign a.id supporters 
are forced to demonstrate to those public servants responsible for the balance 
of payiilents situation, or for trade prrn,1otion, the consistenc;y of the aid effort 
1.1ith ot>.er ;_:no2.lc objsctj_yc:::, survive. necessary 
result:- :Ln a 1.·,orld ,li\~h c~1ronic sLorte.c;e o:i:' foreicrc. e:~cbc.n2:c reserves, has been 
increased t~rinc; of aid to the e::~1or·i.;~; of the c10,:cr co-:..1.:;tries: rather than allow-
inc; bilater2l transfers to generate multilateral trac."'t2 flous. 
A look at the performance of major donors illustrates some of the problems 
of aid. Both Britain anc:1. France reuain heavil~r crn,1.uitted to the:Lr traditional 
ir,1:9erial interests. 9 This is especially true in 1\frica O 1'lhere proc;rc:.r.1r.1es of 
financial aid e.re combined wi tl: the maintenance of elaborate j?r0Grarnr.1es of 
technical assistance. Hith the objective of rno.kinc; the transfer of ac1rninictra-
tions to full local cont1·ol as painless:- and perhaps as s1mr, as possible. 
In some cow.rcries) Government is still depenc',cnt en the r.10ther cow.1try for 
recurrent costs. The virtue in t~1ese 1;irc:::;rm:ir.1cs has been to maintain hie;h levels 
of civil adrJinistration ,,he1·e there uo1-1l(1. other1.:ise have been the danc;er of swift 
deterioration. The cost has ·lJeen the :'.°~:-~J.ure to initi.o.te G.n:,' c;rc3.t e~:pcriments 
in administrative ~)rc,ctice uitl1 the ac:.::Cieve~,ient of fo:cr,1:.:i.l independence. The 
result has been, only too ofte:i > the crc[:tio:r: o:.: elites uho occu1,y the offices 
without any notice3.ble in~iroveri1ent in responsiveness tc the country's problem. 
Too c;reat an exercise of independence on the part of the new African pouers 
dir,1inishes the flow of aicl--this happened abruptly at a ver:r early stage in the 
relationship beb·1een Guinea and France, for example, and has resulted from the 
recent break between T2nzania and Britain. Ae;ain; from the point of view of the 
donor> the action nu~r not be malicious; it was not surprisinc;) after all, that 
suspension of a "f,7 uillion aid offer should flou from Tanzania's decision to 
breal: diplomatic relations ,;ritll Britain I s Labour Government over the ,·reak 
British policy to,·mrds tlle Rhoclesia.n rebellion. 
Generally, l1m-1ever) both Britain :.i.nd France have raana{!;ec.1 to maintain o. 
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consiciero.1Jle deG;ree of· influence ::..n :;:;rcvious colonies. In 1;10.uy parts of' .frica, 
the most se1~ious competitor for influence is the U.S. 
The United States position is cliffe2_·ent. 
"The United States became involvecl in internationo.l 
developr:1ent aid on a i:iajor scule princiiJo.lly as a byproduct of 
the world uicle responsibilities thrmm upon it as a leader of the 
Western Wo:-ld after 1-lorld Har II. The size as uell as the direction 
of u. s. aic~ is an ~rBraordinar:r blend of humanitarian sentiment and 
cold -war stro.teGY. 
1 
' 
Hhile Britain and France have been movinc; from a situo.tion of outri0ht 
control,; bacl: to p;:epo.red gositions of pervasive but less obt1~usive influence~ 
the U.S. has be ~n enc;ac:;ed in the reverse ::_:irocc s s. The U.S. has asserted dorJ.inant 
and overt influence in uo.n:, areas over the po.st decade .. Her involvement is 
carrieci to the necessary breadth of activity and strength of commitIP.ent. 
When the Uni teC:. States decic~es to ma.Le o. uajor coLi:,litment) the ~')enetration 
can be pervasive 3.nc' t:1e effect over':•!:J.elLinc--capital o.id, food su:9plies •. eco-
~1ouicj political an6. ,;1ilitD.r~, ad.visors, educationo.l support. ;_;ucb involvement 
can leo.c1 to econo1:,ic c;routh~ but it co.nnot JC o. satisfactory technique throushout 
the underdevelo:9ed '\'lOrld. In the contezt of severe social tensions; the tendency 
is for the United State:; to j_dentify i:rith conservatives and as they come under 
attack, the possibility of l\merico.n Gilit:1ry involvement arises. The sequence 
is not unlil:e that :ihich in the past has led to the establislment of great empires. 
But for several reasons the United ;3tates is condemned to create an eLD)ire 
based almost exclusively on an extreme syste1il of indirect rule. This could be 
most effective in concJ.i tions in ,.rhich there o.re c:tp:::irol_)riate indiQ;enot~s croups 
11ho can forn effective ac:;encies of U. ,S. polic~r. HmJever ;• too often thee only 
r,.1aterial avo.ilable i.s of sorry quality; an0. ;,i:i.[)°:t b·: e;:riecteu to 1)erforri1 very 
inadequately as ::iror.1ote:cs of cle·velo~,1.1e.11t. Perl-::.a:,Js, civen the inevito.bili t~r of 
-J.1-
can be little C.oubt thc.t if _,;.1crican control \!ere uiTe,~tJ_:; ia.9J.euenteo., am-:. 
i\rnerico.n technology- ::me~ ideolocy brought c~ireetJ.y to ,rorl: on the devclopucnt 
problems in those re:::~ions of curre:1t A!·aerican intc:cest ~ the effects uoulcl be 
economically more settisfactory than those of the dubious governments they find 
the1:1selves bolsterinc;. 
One vieu of' the c1ile;·.inas i,merica faces mu; set out by Millikan and Rm;tow 
in an article in FoTeic;n Affairs in April 195G. Ue quote at length because their 
articl('; has :)roved to be a '..::ooc~ preC.iction of subsequent policy. Rostov has since 
becor.1e the LlD.jor Presidential advisor oL these problems. The;;r cor:1..1cnt that 
"the buildine:; of r,1oc7.ern econouies o.nc1 centralized r.1odern govern­
ments has been c.riven ale.me; less by the profit native than by the 
aspirations for increasecJ national and lnLian dignit~/." 
The lunerican interest in the third '\lorld is fu;.1damer:.tally political> as they 
see it. Countries in the third uorlu are in o. trnnsitional 1,hane in uhich 
nationalism ,;10.y turn in vo.ryinc; proportions to three objectives: one; the 
consolidation of the po,rer cf the nc11 state over old recional interests:. t,·10. 
e;:ternal adventure: three, economic an( social uodernizo.tion. .At the time of 
,rritinG the article, they thouc;ht t~10.t these stratec;ies were typified. b~r Die1J.; 
Hasser, m1d. Nehru re spectively. 
The third objective is critj_cal because it detern1ines the lencth of the 
transition to nodernity. 
"CoJJiaunist policy:." the:r note, "is based squarely on an unclerstandinc 
of this precarious transitional process ... Soviet diplornac;';' and propa;;anda 
have syste;·,1atically souc:;ht to divert their nttention frorn the tasl:s of 
modernization tmrarc:s 'bloody shirt' policies, tliat is, an obsessive 
concern to redress real or believed past hurailiations--colonio.lisrn, Israel, 
Kasbrnir, Hest Irio.n. etc. 
He are conf1:onted ·.1i th a syctenatic effort--diplornatic, :;:isycholoe;ical, 
economic and ;)olitic2.l--to exploit the iTealmesses, confusions, ancl tempta­
tions of ne1..' nat:Lons in the transitional period so as to cla:mp conm1unism 
down finally on theJ1 before steady ecm1omic c;rowth and the political 
resilience of a uocle;.T. state emerc;e. 11 
11 
••• the essentiD.l objective: of ;·,uerico.n :,c,licy in the trancitional 
areo.s is to use 'iThu.tever influence 1-ie can brine to bear to focus tl1e 
local enerr;ies, talents, 8.l1l1 resoJ.rce::: on the constructive tasks of 
L1ocJ.ernizatio1L n 
The:',r iclentif;y three propositions 
"first; that }Jrivate ente1·)rise in superior in efficienc;,,r to public 
enterp::.·isc) even in the underdeveloped areas; second._ that substantial 
untapped potentiaJitie::; exist in public policy both for expo.nc1inc; 
A1,1er;.car: fJrivo.-ce C8.~,ital e::ports and for increo.sed colluboration 
behreen public am: private sources of capito.l; anc:. third, that the 
Ju:ierican c;o-verru,1ent could Qo r,1ore than it is noH doinc; to create o. 
rn:Jre 1'2,vourctble clirnate for p~:ivate investE1ent in the underdeveloped 
areei.::; o 11 
They see; hm,eve1· t:nect too S'Jift returns on their proposed proc;ram ;nust 
not be e:~l_)ected. 1'7l1.:;.t ir, needed. is 
11 
••• u sense of histor:-.r and patie,.1ce ... to .see us throuc;h into the stac;e 
when r.0 ost r:1en cmc1 2:overm.ients in the ,rorld corae to preceive tho.t 
~)r i vate ca~)itali s1.1, domestic cmc~ fore i:3r:, has an e:qxmc1in(£ role to plo.y 
in the neu nations ca1nble of reinforcinG their larc;er political anc.;. 
cocie..l objectives.''. 
i'l.t tl1e conclusion, the uTite:cs comi:ient: 
"In o.dc1i tion, ther<:: rei;:o.ins the challen::;in;; anc~ o:trer.1ely iLli.)or cant 
tasl: of finclinc; a r.iethocl and an instrw:1ent foi· co-orclinatinc; tllc econoL1ic 
development i_)rou;ranc, nou r:1ai'1ly bilateral:, llithin the free uorlC:f." 
A major ques-:.ion fo:t Co.nacla is -t:.o e:~o.uine the decree to which it aerees 
uitl, this perceptioc1 of the problem .:md the remedies proposed. 
The i;mjor fault of tllio positior, ~-s that it c;rossly oversir.11Jlifies the 
is c;ood for neither the fir:::t nor tl1e tllirC. uorlc,_ It involves t~1e u:m1erdeveloped 
,10rlcl in the inter".lo.l yro'uler.1s of t11e U.S. o.nC:l in tl"e conflict betueer::. the first 
ancl second Forlds, Fo.irly quicU.y the e:;oai_ of -=ipeninc; u~, these coLm"~rics to 
ter:i.ptations 11 becoues the enc. i:1 ::.tcelf'. 
Unclerclevelopec1 coW1trie:· :.1ust solve tt2:Lr :,roblc,;1s J.n the contc,zt of their 
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mm his tor:;·, L1stcc.c", of fo:..·cin.::_· upon ti1cr::. the mytlrn conventior.o.l ,:i sc~o1.1s of 
other countries stress should be placed en :.:;ivinc; them ;:10Te roc,1~1 to 1.nne:wer 
Il.r_ported clevelop1.::.ent st::..'atec;ics dicl not uorL unc1.e1· pnleo-colonialis,11 and there i2. 
not nuch reason to e:~pect them to work .under neo-colonialism. 
For the 11Third l!orld 11 one possibility uas to rnanipulo.te Cold 1:-Tar cornpeti tion. 
'I'he existence of a Soviet Bloc ,:1iGht be thou:1ht to provide aic7.. and tro.dc :_Jossi--
b-:.lities; and to allow the poor countries r.iore mnncuverability in their efforts 
to r.1aintc.in their freec1oi;1 f'rorn the Free :7orlcl. That this could be so in lJTactice 
112.s inc1icatec by the r1erfor:.10.~::.ce cf the u .. , .11. over ·che yeJ.:cs. The rer.10.rl:able 
r:ucces:..;es o:C' the E:::i.sse:c :·,::__:iuc r:12..~.- b'.': i~i pJ.rt due to tbe :fo.ct that thei1• ~Jost 
::;ev121·e con:.:'rontc.tion -;•ri th the Free ":'.o:..·lC::. c2,1.1e L1 th.:;ir conflict ui th B:citain and 
France r.'..ither than the U.S. Tl1e 2ossibilitie::; of this altermi.tivc Lm:::t not be 
e:rn.c0eratec1. The Soviet Union has shoa:,n no entlmsiam.1 for nn~.r Great e::-q_Jo.nsion 
of its role in the less developed uorld. If c.n:,,,th5.n.=.;: it has te:i.1dcc.1. toi:mrc1s 
increasinr; caution. Soviet o.id has been limitec.1 and ho.s 'ueen as lllUch attached 
to the particulo.:t e;:.port potentialities of the ;:}oviet economy as lms the bilo.teral 
aid uhich emanates fron the '.·[est, and in many cases 1 a good de.'..il less stillfully 
applied. Further J the inc1·easin3 detente betv1een the Soviet anc~ the U.S. in the 
Cold ~!ar must no.rrow the possibiL.ties of the less c1eveloped uorl( in this 
respect. 
China has:, sur:i;:,risinc;ly enouc;h, at tir.1es provided c;enerous and sensible 
fina.r.ce. Surprisin13ly, as her oun economic situation is no better tho.n that of the 
countries she has aiclec":.. Hm:ever, the possible mo.terio.l contribution of China 
nust obviousl~' be e;:tr-2uely li1.,i te:::1 b;,- tl1c~ urc,;ency of her oun needs. The role 
of Chino. is lilore lil:ely to serve as an e:m1,1p1e of the possibility of (levelo11ment 
uithout der:enclence--not in the sense of Mo.oist revolution:, but 1·ather in a rnore 
c;encral sense of the possibility of indei)endent o.ction ~ if backed by sufficient 
will and unity over 2 larr:;e 2.r;ou?h 2rea. 
Thus, in a broac outline, the r,l,:.br11 context fr, ; 7idch Ct!Lai:n must consider 
its relationship with t,ie underdeveloped W•'.)rld is one ir, uhict · 
(i) colonial dependency hat ended but independence has not been achieved; 
(ii) the new forms of control may be less effective in engendering develop-
rnent than t:he benevolent paternalism of som0 µarts of ':he o] d ccloni.alism; 
(iii) freedom of maneuver in the less developed world der,ends p2rtly on the 
diversity of nlternatives in the rich world. 
V 
A Productive Role for C2nn<la 
It is well for small countries not to exagrcra.t.~ their own importance. 
They should also recognize that the ;rand design of ·:wrlcl affairs is not ex­
clusively the product of the great powers. 
Canada cannot transform the world because of her small size and because 
the pursuit of policies contradictory to those ~f the U.S. will involve costs 
of retaliation and loss of goodwill. 
Further, there is nothing in the character of Canadian society which would 
suggest that if it became a major particip.ant in the communication with the poor 
countries, it would not eventually develop similar policies aP.d attitudes as the 
other great powers. It has nbt, in the Hest Indies, perfon1ed notably differently 
from other powers. 
However, some potentialities exist. Canada. with :ci gross national product 
of $57 billion, commands a greater annual flow of output than the whole of black 
Africa, or of India. Canada, a nidget coF,pare(! with tl'!e North American colossus, 
still has economic capabilities comparable to major regions of considerable 
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nic;nificance. If Cc-.nada ever 2.llocuted .1,; of her national product to the aid 
0proc;rai1U'J.e as ~;ro1Jised in the recent [;:9cech L 0L1 the Throne (instead of one 
quarter of one per cent in past years), he:r; .corifribution would be of similar 
orcler to tho.t curi·el1tl~r ;;10.c.le b~r Bi·itain; nllen it is also considerecl that there is 
a heavy concentration of the J\uerican :yro~rar.ime in recions of special American 
interest:, (i)urticulo.rly those .J.reas in uhich hcav~r L1ilitar::,,- aid is provided), 
it becor.ies clear that it uould be feasible for Canac."1.a to uainto.in a p:coc;railli:1e 
in selectet. rec;ions of' the develo::,inc; 11orld of finai1cial raac;nitudes similar 
to those of tl,c ezistinc:; aajoi· donors. 
1-ioreover ., Cano..da has Dore potentio.l :i.'or a fle1~ible proc;rar:n,1c than c;overn­
ment::; uho have ;,1c..int2.incc.1. ;:.iajor ;iroc;:cm-.irnes over the 10113 period. The British 
are ho.nstru.nc; oy e:dstin:_; ::enc~ onGoinc; political oblications. Givers as Hell as 
receivers o.re boun(. b: · the :)c1st. B:dtain fincls that •uith a 1)rocra1;n;1e staGnant 
in total size there is ve17 .little fle::ibili t~r to strite out in neu c.lircctions, 
even if there is o. c1.esirc to c1o so. The lacL of traditional commit-
ments, or stron::_,;ly defined e::istin::; interectB; makes it possible to conceive of 
a Canacliar: o.id :;::iolic)r uith :.1orc fle;:ibilitJ and norc attention to the needs of 
the develo:pinc; uorld than ~1oulc'i. be e;:pected of 1:10.ny other major donors. 
If CanaC.a 11ere uilli:1:;, it could ho.ve nn iupact beyond the irnmed.iate 
effect of the transfer::: involved. If, fo1· e;:w:1ple :, Canad::.>. stood reacl:,r to increase 
the level of her corJr1ituent in cases uhere the 1·eci)ient country hac~ fallen 
foul of other donors•· tl1:i.s 11oul(: ctrenc;then the barc;aininc; position of the poorer 
countries in their dec.linc;s ".!ith the other rich countries. The fact that Canada 
,ms for exo.::n~;le :, o.ble to _;_'ill ·,;o.rt of' the G;/J.~) follorinc:; the dis1:1antlinc; of the 
Uest Gcrnun assir:;t~:ncc ::_)rocro.;,1,,1e to Tanz.::.nio. L:.inil':1ized the: costs to Tanzania of 
pur suin.:; o.n inue:)cnL1ent ;_iolitico.l ;}oli c~r, Ho.c~ this c.ltcrno.tive not been open 
con-to Tanzani;:i_ the:;:c -.roulc1 be :::'i c:cprcssir::.c; effect on other ,,frican countries 
tcr.lJ:llatinc; effc::t::; to assert thei1' i:Joli. tic:::.l incleJ:)endcnce. 
(?rl ,...--,.Such n role uiJ.l 110t be ,(...i.;_,'-'.. conflicts ~ith entrenched 
econo,;1ic interests arc involved. J'is thin ~)aper is beinc uritten, the ConGo-
Kinshasa. c;overrn;1ent is enG:o.c;ce:. in c.irect c01L-:'rontation uith Union 1--iinicre over 
the controJ. of t11e Conc;ole sc copper indust17. The recoTd of the Union I-liniere 
in the Conc;o han been a sorr;,,,r one of subvernion and intric;ue. In li:_,;ht of recent 
uml }.)ant Conc;olene history, a Cone;olcse c;overn;.:.cnt oi' an~, 1·epute uould uish to 
assune control over the (:ecisions arn.l ,~ain 2.ccess to the :property of the Union 
liiniere, Their o.bilit;-,r to c1o ::;o efl'cctively however, ,1ill (1epem1 not only on 
the abilit~, of tile im1ie;enous c;ovcrm.1ent to uithstanC. incursions of :i:oreic;n 
eleuents into their J_)oli·ticrJ bL1t ,,ill also rcquir2 the1,1 to uaintain the operation 
of the industry in tl1e cvc1"!.t of the cTiti1dro.uo.l of' Bel::;io.n technical personnel 
and an internettionally 01·;_:ariizeC~ attc1,1)t to J)revent access of Conc;olese copper 
sus~•ectc tliat the I3elc;iw,1 covernment andto 1:01·ld i,u:cl:ets. Un:::'o:c·tuno.tely: one 
Union Miniere ,!oulc': be ,·aore ef:..'ective in controllinc; the sale of Conc;ole se 
e:r_:?orts than the British c;overlli,1ent has ".:Jeen in restraininc; i1hoc.1esio.n e:~portc. 
In a case such ets this. if it co::1e::; to eventual confrontation. it secas 
unlil:ely thnt Canada. uoulcl pursue ~_)olicics oyenly o.t vo.riance i:ilth tl1ose of 
the rest of the "F:;.,·ec '.701·ld
11 
• Inc1eec1; one sees i10 s1,eci::i.l reason to su~)pose 
that Canadians --:roulcl 11c:.ve an;;- c~esire ·to C.:.o so. The yoint is tho.t it is Canada' c 
oun choice, not her lir.1i'.::.el1 resou1·ces, 1.1llic11 restro.in her independence. 
Cana<.lo. i:lill onl:· _ :lrovi(e o.lte:;.,·"10.tivcs Hhen tile confrontation betueen poor 
o.nc-:. rich does not ir.1.pinc;e ol'l those :;.:1te:s.1csts i:,hich the ric:1 snare and cleo.rly 
recoc;nize. 
Houcver, short of :~clch confronto.tions, Co.no.cb cnn c.lsc have 0.11 effect by 
different fTon tllose of' othc:r c~onors. One cct of such cri teric. could be, for 
e:~ru;1ple, baccc:'. upon the cittc~:iJG to ic.:'enti:C'~- the countries Llore liLely to achieve 
the rn1xiL1urJ. c.1evelo::_:iment im:x.1.ct. Such criteria woulcl have the virtue, in the 
Canadian conte;:t. of 8n appearance of neutrality. It is doubtful; of cource, 
uhether n sir.1.1,le set of sucll cr:;.teria could be defined~ there are o.lso, for 
e:cnrJ.ple, sim.9lc redist:tibutive objectiveD ,Tl1ic~1 I:1.ic;ht also r;eer:i desirable 
(e . .z,: fCt:nine relief-type notivation). 
Provi::;ion o-l o.ic.~ to tl1ose lil::.cly to ual:e nost effective use of it uoulc.~. 
provide for :9::i.tte::.·ni:; of f'inc..2:1ce c:uitc diffe:!."ent fj_•or.1 those of otller 1.1aj or donors. 
Hm-1 far ,ml0.lcl :lt 'lJe )O~rniblc fo:c Cnno.dct in practice to gursue such o. rnc1ically 
neutral course·? 
A little thou,:)1t ·,:01..1.ld im"\icatc ::::o:·.1e ,~i:~i'ficultic::;. Could Cc.nadc. cnvi::;o.ce 
the possibilii:,~r of :;:i1·ovic1in __; CLi(, pr::;-,.:;1•2;;;nes to iforth Koreo. or iTortll Victno.r.1, 
for e~:ar.1.ple? Thio is too c:~t:c·e:.ic :::'01· :.,ost Co.n:J.e:.ians ~Ju-t. tl1e dro.L1atic cliplonatic 
achievenents of F:;:·o.ncc su::..;:;est ·;:,llo.t in<c:i:ender::.t coun.,ef.: of oction o.re pocsible. 
Canada to nove in nic_;;-1ifica:1tl:r c:.iffeJ:en-::-, diTections froi-;1 Ju:ierican-imc;lo policy, 
uhile avoic1inc; overt c:i:1allenc;e. ~n.1en 2 c1evelo21 inc; country bec;ins to ::._,ursue 
policies renderinc; it sor.ic".•bo.t Gl,spcct in terus of foreic;n policies of the "Free 
Horld" ~ but llas not ~,et been proi,1oted to tlle list of public ener,1ieo it uic;ht 
be possible for Co.no.cl.a to e::tenc} ::m:9:90:ct 1:ithout o.::._,pearinc; too obviousl:' out::·ci.G;eous. 
If C::rnad.a 11e1·e ,li1linr; to ado~,t such 2. role, coulcl it not be arQ;uec1 that her 
mm proc;ra;:Jr.le s ,.·oulc1 corlt:..,in t~1e so.uc neec:.s of deDorali zo.tion '\'Thi ch Here identified 
above as the l:cy O.anc;e1· o:c' c:::.i.sti'.:::_; ~Eo~~ro.Lli.lcs? This is unlil:el;,/, for a nllluber 
of reasons. 
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no:.,es of the other Free ':Iorld c;overnments, the chances a::ce that the covernments 
concerned uoulc"!. be p1·ecisely those 11ho are assertinc national autonony and are 
least susceptible to cultural demoralization. Secondly, Canada will ul1mys enter 
the scene as an influence slich-t.ly different frou the previous external influence. 
U.S. involvement in Africa, for e:.::ru:1ple :, often has the beneficial effect in under­
:mininc; the mystique and cultural influence of the i"Jrevious colonial power, 
merely because alternatives are offered, in relation to education for example, 
,;1hich irnplicitly chullenge the assumptions of existing institutions. To some 
cleo;ree Canadian influence uoulcl not present the danc;er of bolsterinG inherited 
colonial institutions. 
Also, Canada. has all the blandness of a prosperous but minor po11cr. 
Alone; i'Ti th S11itzerland and Scandinavia, Canada share the characteristics of 
substantial success in achievinc; economic ,·Tell-being along with the absence 
of Lilperial ar:ibition, neither as a contenporary career, nor as an historical 
inheritance, nor even as a cl.ream of things to come. One has only to talk of 
a Canaclian, or a S11iss empire to realize hoi'l ludicrous the idea is. It is 
the fate of such countries to produce neither revolutions nor empires--but 
as Switzerland has sho,m, it is possible fo:c thern to be cone havens both for 
fugitive funds ancl refuc;ee politicians. It is possible for them to consicler 
revolutions with cquaniuity--theJ are neither lil8.3r to be imported nor do they 
challenGe any ar.ibition. It is reasona.blc to suppose that Canada coulcl mount 
an aid pro(;rarnme less o.tto.ch~c1 too. set of ideoloc;ical values than those nations 
reEponsible for the uorld 's future. Therein lies the iLl)_)Ortance of unir.1portance. 
However sl:illfully Ce.nndn uses her aicl l"lrocrmJ1:1e there is cm upper limit 
on the effect that can be obt.::tined frou this instrtm1ent. \·le 1110,~r throuc;h clever 
planninc increa.se the leverae;e of oUJ.· aid;. but the pressure ue can e:~ert is still 
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lirJ.ited b;,;,T the fact that it is unlil~ely that ue uill spend r.mch rnore than l',j of 
G.rr.P., if that. If ue mmt to play a r.iore i,•.iportant role_ ue rnuct find. less 
costly devices. Internationo.l tro.c~e is one such instru::.1ent, since it has the 
au.vantac;e of benefitine:; both tradinc 2_)artners. An iYJ.aginative trade policy 1lill 
enable us to help others ac 11ell as ourselves and 1rithout straininc; charitable 
instincts. 
There can be little cloubt tho.t there is much roor.1 for i:11prover.1ent in the 
efficiency Hith ,1hich ue tracJ.e uith the third uorlC:; the obi:;tacle ic thn.t it 11ould 
require us to thin:~ the unthinl:abl.e; to consider policies ,rhich every layr:ia.n l:nous 
to be uronc; but every econonist Lnous to be ric:ht. If~ for exara.plc, lie decided 
to import certain r.ic.nufo.ctured c;oods froD 1.mcle;.~developed countries, they uould 
gain because of the increased r.iarLet, 11hile 1·1e ,wuld (3ain fror.1 louer costi:;. In 
other 1-10rds, throuch tr2.de He can use the j_)roduction fncili ties of other countries 
to suppler,1ent our o,m. At the so.::1e tine, t;.1e;;,r can use our specific re::;ources to 
supple1.1ent thei1·c. 
He ,·1ould have to pay for these inc;.·eaced im.ports throuc,h increasec1 e;q_)orts 
n.nd there's the rub. He have been so used to thinl:in:3 in terms of ex.port pessi@ism 
that this probleri1 seems to be an overuhelr.iing one. A little care 11oulcl sh011 that 
it is not. 
First and r.10st inportant 1 there ic a severe shortaGe of food loor.iinc on the 
horizon. Canada could probably increase procluction of foodstuffs at constant 
prices much more quietly than underdeveloped countries can. The reason 1-1e uill 
have clifficulty sellin~ as nucl1 as '.le can :siroduce is that the underdeveloped 
countries uill have diff:i.culty puyinc; :::'or it. If ue bouc;ht nore manufactured 
e;oods, ue couli..1 sell narc ac;riculturo.l ~)roc1ucts. Clearly;• there is a need. for o. 
far more ima[:;inative t;.·ac1e-cree:.tinc; :_iolic:,r b~, Canada tllun has been the case to date. 
There is no need to restrict our thinkinc; to the export of foodstuffs. 
The underdevelopecl com1tric s l1nve an insatiable deuand for nachinerJ,r of all 
l:inc.1s. If Canadian industry used its in~enuity. it could open up lare;e Llllrl:ets 
for sale to the third i:rorlc.1, provided of course, 11e ·uere willinc; to buy from it 
as well. 
If these profitable posGibilities :fm.• trade are not tal:en aclvantace of) it 
·uill not be because they do not exist, but because Canada lias not haet enou0h 
i1:1aGination. 
The first requirene:it uoulc1 be a uillincncss to imacine cradual but radical 
chanc;es in our econonic structure. 1:e uould c;ive up some of our industries ancl 
import these c;oocls fro,_1 afar. \1e uould the1·efore c;ain fle:::ibili ty, cliversifyinc; 
our trade sources and incree:sinc; our inde::_)enclence by looseninc; certain of our 
present close ties. Secondly, our cornparative advantac;e uoulcl coue to depend 
more on our sl:ills and technoloc;y thm1 our natural resource base. The skills 
of our entre:9reneurs and labour could be increased and our "capacity to transform" 
enhanced. 
If we decided on this course of action. neu institutions for pror;1otinc; trade 
uould be needed. Just louerin:::; tariff and other barriers is not enouc;h. One of 
the most im:'..)ortant obstacles to increased traue is inadequate inforr.10.tion on 
rJ.arl:etinc opportunities. The :,_)resent international distribution and cor.1mercial 
s:1,rste1:1 is more suited to the inadequate riattcrns of trade of the past than to the 
tasl: of creatinc; neH :;;>os:::iuilities fo1· the future. Construction of neu tracle 
channels requires c;overrn,1ent as ~:ell as :r_,rivate initiative and thouch it ,,ould 
involve nmny L:ifficulties, the pnyofi' ':rill be corres;1ondinc;ly hi6h" 
In the present conte;:t) United States an<l Eu:co::;e have not tat:en aL1-vantace 
of prof'itable ne11 opporttmitie:::, :;:Jnrtl~r because of their political obli0ations, 
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)O.rtly beco.u::;e t11e:,r have o. vesteC. interest in the e::istinc; structure, anC:: ~)artly 
because they are trappec.1 bJ their olc.: ideas. Co.nacla could use the opportunities 
available not only to increase her 01m trade uith the third uorld, but also to 
increase trade bet,,een other rich countries and the third uorld. Canada could 
play an active role as an economic 1,1iddleman in the international economy just 
as she prides herself in !)la;,,rinc; a r:1ic.;.dle role in the politico.l syster.1. il.lthouc;h 
a sHall pouer, Canada can act as a brol:er bet1veen uore powerful interests. 
Not only could Canada trade 1aore, she riliGht thinl~ in terr.is of investinc; 
;_1ore abroad. Cc.nadians are so useC to thintinc; of themselves as a capital-scarce 
country and a recipient of forei:;n invest1~1ent tha.t they have not considered the 
possibility of reversil1c; the :cole. 
Canada, relative to the Horlt: as a ,Jhole; is richly enc.1mred uith ca.pital, 
tcclmoloc;y, and entrepreneurshi:._,. Her lone; e::pe1~ience uith foreic_;n investors 
could be used to c.1evise neir foru.s, r.1ore beneficial to the recipient cotmtry 
than those available at present. Canada could perhaps create a neu t:,rpe of 
international corporation. l,iost firr:is o.t l)re sent are not internatioa.:i.l but) in 
fact, have their center of eravit:y in a pnrticuia.r developed cou:1try. Their 
narl:etino; conce~)ts) personnel policies, and technolo0y are c.l.eveloped in the 
conc.l.itions of the advanceu. countrics and are often ill-suited to more ba.cl::\mrd 
countries. These corporations have li:·.1ite<.1 horizons and. do not understand the 
l)roduction proble!JS and factor ava.ilnbility in the underclevelopec: uorld. They 
a.re very lare:;e; feu in nw-aber; and have c;reat barco.ininc.; pouer vis-a-vis the ,reak 
0overnuents of the U11c.lerdevelo::_)ecl uorlcls. An pJ:-ofi t r.1a::i1:1izinc; institut ions;, they 
use this pouer full:r, often 1x::.cl~cc: UD by the :1olitical strenc;th of' tl1e:;.r coU11try. 
An an e1:a.11i1le of uhat Co.nacia could. do. consider the effect of the Italian Oil 
Cor.1.pany, a J:.lUb1ic2-:.' oune( cor:_)oro.tion: ·phich for a 11hile challcn.:,;ed the 
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oliQ;ol)olistic po:::;i tion of the cxistin~; oil firras. It offered better terms J neu 
fo:::-1.1s o:i.' orc;anization, ::mc7. 30.ve the underclevcloped country an enlarc;ec.1 set of 
c..ltcrnativcs fron uhicll to choose. 
As Dudley Seers points out, sr.1all countries facinc; bi::; companies are in a 
~~1Uc11 s t ron:3er b . . . t . l there is. c;enu:rne coupet·1· t ion.. 12 If it werearc;a1n1n2; J)OSl ·ion 1-nen . 
po::;sible to creo.te Cana<.lian firr.1s capo.ble of independent action in the inter­
n::-.tiono.l econony and ·uilling to upset e:-:istinc structures:, Canadian bu::,iness ui~ht 
be able to pla~r a creatiVE: role. 
VI 
Cun2.da is small, rich and fits nicely into her niche. Her policies are sobe:!'.' 
and sensible, in aid as elseuherc. One choice is to continue alone cst2.blished 
ix:ths. 
Uhat does it rJ.ean to have an independent foreic,1.1 policy? If 
uc o.:3ree 11ith the policies of the major powers) there is no reason to bahave 
diZferentl~'. If ,re c'..isar_~rce, ,re have sonc difficult d.ecisions to r.10.l~c. 
There is a small bird 11hich feeds by pickin~ food froL1 betueen the teeth 
of the hippopotauus; thi:::; bird is most expert in judc;inc when hippopoto.D.i clo;.:e 
their uoutlrn. (Hote: One source claius that the story is apocryphal :::.ncl an;y 
applies to a crocodile. No matter!) 
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1. Specifications of the social welfare function in recent optimum 
growth literature recognize· diminishing marginal utility from one-period 
.. (in continuous-time vers:tons, instantaneous) consumption per capita--hence-
forth CPC--, a fundamental principle about which there is little disagree­
ment. This implies that the elasticity of marginal utility--hencefortl1 
1 e'--from CFC is numerically greater than_z.~. 
In the presen:: paper we suggest another fundamental principle from 
which it follows that, with irdependent one-period utilities, 'e' should 
.. . 
be numerically greater than .1!.DLtv, A stronger assertion than diminishing 
marginal utility alone• 
. This principle is derived from the following question: Imagine 
CPC in all periods except two to be given. Cijll CPC in the two periods in 
question X and Y respectively. Given an initial technology--a function 
showing the maximu:n amount of Y given different amounts of X--, and a 
corresponding social choice of X and Y, how would society revise its choice 
if a superior technology were available, offering the same absolute amount 
of X (or Y) but a higher rate of transformation of X into Y (or Y into X)? 
1 
The principle being suggested is that society would like to have 
more of ,hnt:h X and Y. In other words, it would like to distribute the 
benefit of the superior technology defined as above among both the "genera­
. tions" concerned, with positive shares of this benefit to both. This prin­• 
ciple, the intrinsic ethical merit of which needs hardly be pointed out, 
will be called the ~9DS£Pt21 principle of temooral eouitv. 
~he author is indebted to Professor J. R. Hicks for corr1r:0nts on 
an earlier draft of the paper. 
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In the familiar terminology of consumer theory, the above prin-
ciple implies that the "cor.unodity11 concerned--in this case both X and Y, 
more generally, CPC-- has a strongly positive "income effect" so as to• 
offset the "substitution effect" that works in the opposite direction when 
•' 
the relative price of this ·commodity rises with· consumer's budget in terms 
of this commodity remaining unchanged. The term "superior good" is a 
natural suggestion for such a commodity. We are, in other words, suggesting 
that CPC be regarded as a "superior good" in analysis of social optimization 
over time. 
2
2. The implication of this principle may first be seen graphically. 
Let X and Y be represented in the horizontal and vertical axes of 
a social indifference diagram~ Let T and T represent two alternative1 2 
states of technology. Suppose social optimizaiion with technology r is
1 
given by the point M, lying on the _vertical line L. If X is a "superior 
good" defined as above, optimizat:i:on with. technology T must occur at. the
2 
right of the line L. This requires that the marginal rate of substitution 
of X for Y (the subjective price at the margin of X in terms of Y)--hence­
forth SX y--at the point of intersection N of the lines T and L should , 2 
be higher than the slope of the line T • Noting that the X-coordinates
2 
of the two points M and N are .the same, and the X-intercepts of th~ lines.. 
T and T are the same, it is easy to see that this implies that SX ,1 2 ,Y 
given X, should rise (or fall) more than proportionately to a rise (or 
fall) in Y. In other words, the partial elasticity of the function 







Math~matica lly, the above implies that 
a (sx Y) 
• !,...~-- 1 ,ay ~ --=---""sx y, / 
or ya<J;ix;wy) • 
a:: WX/Wy 
ponding social welfare function 
>
(with CPC 
1, where W(X,Y) is the corres-
in all other periods given), 
or 
1·, for any given X; 
•· 
or 1, for any given X. 
-• 
In other words, for any given X, the difference between the 
elasticities of the two margi~3l one-peri~d utility functions with respect 
to Y should be numerically greater than unity. 
Analogously, Y is a sup2rior good if the sarae condition holds with 
the arguments X and~ interchanged. 
•• 
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The above relation holds whether one-period utilities are inde-
pendent or not. If they are independent, as it has been assumed in all 
optimum growth studies the auth0r knows of, then WXY = "\x = O. The re-
quirement that X and Y and, in general, CPC, is a superior good reduces 
Z =- X, Y,C_PC.then to the condition that -w22 .X >1, In other words,Wz 
the elasticity of marginal utility from CPC in each period should itself 
be numerically greater than unity. 
3. Some comments on the celebrated "unsuccessful e::~periment
11 of Tin-
bergen /8/ an~. the "ha~sh" conclusions derived by Goodwin /5/ are in order. 
Both Tinbergen and Goodwin used values of 
I e' less than unity, 
thus violating the principle suggested in this note. Tinbergen based his 
choice of 1 e 1 --'v' in Tinbergen's problem in terms of surplus (over sub• 
sistence) consumption--as 0.6 o~
/ 
obs~rved market behavior of individuals 
which is not quite relevant to the problem in question. 
3 
The failure of 
.. 
his experiment, in the sense of failure· to provide a meaningful optimum 
growth path for his infinite-horizon problem and a credible one for his 
finite-horizon problem, may therefore b~ attributed to the.use of a value 
of 'e' that cannot be rationalized either on objective grounds--because it 
was not based on relevant empirical data--, ·or on subjective grounds--
·because it v5.olates the fundamental orinciole of temporal equitv. _ Lacking 
relevant empirical data, a choice of 
1 e 1 has to be rDtionalized in subjec-; 
tive terms or considered totally arbitrary. If we rationalize it in terms 
of the fundamental principle of temporal equity, then we know that optimum 
11 norm2l" shape th2t is actually brought outgrowth paths would have the more 
by Tinbergen1 s mathematics /Ibiq., p. l18S/ corresponding to the case where,· 
1 v' is greater than unity. 
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Goodwin's harsh policy towards earlier--and poorer--generations 
also stands rejected by the same principle. In addition, his conclusion 
/!.!2.i£., p. 764/ that "To justify robbing of the poor now to pay the rich 
later••••• is implied by the enormous productivity of modern techniques'', 
.and the even more sweeping one /µ. 773/ that "the genera 1 prescriptions are 
not very dependent on the oartlcular c:ssumotions about social valuation. 
(italics added) must be regarded as totally unwarranted. 
4 
For a higher 
productivity implies that a smaller sacrifice is needed from earlier genera­
tions for any given increase in ther consurr.ption of lntor generations> thus 
making it possible to increase the consumption o.f both earlier and later 
generations from any given amount of initial resources. And a social wel­
fare function that requires that in such a situation both the generations 
should be given higher consumption, thus implying that 'e' is greater than 
unity; is a perfectly tenable one and has, it may be claimed, a strong .cl 
priori ethical reas-0ning. 
Conclusion 
Impressive mathematical strides hzv·e been made in optimum growth 
theory in recent years, out not enough thought has been given to the basic 
5ethical sense of its postua ltes. It is however on the strength of the latter 
, that an "optimum" growth path is u:..timately to be accepted or rejected as 
a policy prescription. For this reason it is imperative that the ethical 
implications of the basic postulates be fully explored and laid bare. The 
preient note is but a modest contribution in this direction. 
Md. Anisur Rahman 
Institute of Advanced Projects 





. 1 • In terms of the diagram that follc.ws, the superior technology is. -
defined to give a higher slope with the same X-intercept of the T-function. 
In reality a superior technology will give a higher X-intercept also if 
consumption ir. al! pre,:ious pcriocls are to remain unchanged, except if X 
refers to the period from wh~ch the superior technology is available, which 
may or may not be the bAse period. The purpose of the present analysis is 
however to de:riv2 ~~ subjecti-.1£ propert/ of tl1e socinl welfare function, and 
for this it is irrele·rnnt ~.het;:er sucL-c! tcchnicc1l c:-·.1er:g0., Le._. a t,~chnical 
change that changes on::.y tLe s J.o:,e ar:d not the X-intcrc8F of the relevant 
T-function, cictuali.y ncc~:rs, A:!.so, it is useful ::.n any c~se to :rake &r 
analytical disti:ict:·_on betwceu t:ic 11 sloi:,e effect", .,s it were, corresponding 
to a change in the slopn c-,;:-,_ly; ancl the "intercr,?t-e£icct11 r::crrespondin;; to 
a change in the :.ntercep': only. While consumption of X i;iay increase if 
a rise in its relative price is associated with a forward shift of the 
X-intercept of the T-functionJ the principle being ·suggested in this paper 
asserts that it should increase even if the offsetting "intercept-effect" 
is not present, for a rise in real income is implied by an increase in the 
slope alone (with intercept unchanged), and it is natural to desire that the 
.. benefit from this rise in real in~om.-~ be distrib·Jted between both the 
/
"generations" concerned. 
2. Since the positive income effect ensurf's an increase in the consump­
tion of the commodity in whose 'favor' relative price changes) the condition 
that a rise in real income of the type being investigated should result in 
increased consumption of both the commodities needs only '.:>e verified in 
the case of the corrunodity \·.'hich becomes relativel:· de2rer. 
I 
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3. Tinbergcn in any case was working· with a gros::;ly o,,crdeterminate 
model for his estimatioi'. of 'v'. The particular value 0.6 that he computed 
•.
• 
follows only from the specific pair of consumption levels he actually used 
·' 
quite arbitrarily. If one uses other pairs of consumption levels and the 
corresponding w's from the same Frisch data /4/, quite different estimates 
of 'v', varying systematically with the choice of the levels of consump­
tion in question, would be obtained. This is true even though Tinbergen's 
.'v' refers to surplus (over sabsistence) consumption: it can be shown 
from the same Frisch data that he used that his nssumption of constancy of 
'v' is not borne out by reveal~d individnal behaviour. 
4. A sind. larity with Gcoch-!in' s 11 optimum11 paths of investment of 
"optimum" investment patterns derived with a different approach /3/ has 
been noted by the authors of the latter approact. The social ~elfare function 
used in this latter study is linear (i.e., zero elast~city of marginal 
utility from one-period consurr.ption), and hence the 11 optimum11 path derived 
therefrom are given entirelv by constraints imposed (arbitrarily) on the 
growth path; Goodwin's "optimum" path on the other hand is given directly 
from choice of·an 'e' less than unity in a .non-linear social welfare 
function. A comparison of the two resulting investment patterns is not 
..
• 





5., Optimum growth theorists ha-.;e actually tended to disregard 
strategic assumptions i.n their analyses and souzht to explain unconvincing 
results in terms of other factors. Chakravarty, for example, explains /1/ 
the failure cf T:1.nberg~n' s expe:d.ment in terms of the m-:lthematical di fficul­
ties. of infinite-·horizon plc1ni1ing, and takes up finite-horizon planning /2/ 
in 01:Ge,. tu "by-?aS!.: 11 these difficulties. Goo~~in never explains why he 
. choosP-s 'e' as less than urity; and explains his un:onvincing results in 
terlJls o.f the 11 enormo,_;s :,;:.:oductivi'!:y ·of n:od~rn techniqu~·s"! While it is use-. 
ful to !<.nm.; what infi:!Lte ·ho:d ~-on planning and the enormous p1:oductivity of 
modern techniques im?l7 with =e; lc,ss than unity, it is also pertinent to 
enquire what it means in deeper si'Jbjective terms for 'e 1 • to be less than 
i 
unity. Such enquj ricu mc:y r::vea }: i n•·;ight s that may lead to a choice of 
. I 
I 
basic assumptions independent of 
1ant::.cipated results ::ind yet preclude 
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